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MURRAY V. UNITED STATE. 1 LEGALLY REDISCOVERING
ILLEGALLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
EARLY IN 1983, federal agents received information implicat-
ing Michael F. Murray, James D. Carter, and others in a con-
spiracy to possess and distribute illegal drugs.2 This information
was corroborated by law enforcement officials and through a spot
surveillance conducted by federal agents.3 At about 1:45 p.m. on
April 6, 1983, federal law enforcement agents observed Murray
drive a truck and Carter drive a camper into a South Boston
warehouse.4 About twenty minutes later, Murray and Carter
drove the vehicles out of the warehouse. At that time, those inves-
tigating agents looked in the warehouse and saw two individuals
and a tractor-trailer rig, which carried a long, dark container. Af-
ter Murray and Carter had relinquished control of the truck and
camper to other drivers, those vehicles were seized and the drivers
were arrested. Agents discovered marijuana in both vehicles.'
Upon learning that the vehicles contained marijuana, the fed-
eral agents forced entry into the South Boston warehouse. The
warehouse was unoccupied, but numerous burlap-wrapped bales
were in plain view, which were later found to contain marijuana;
the agents also "detected a strong odor of marijuana."6 Without
disturbing the bales, the agents left the. warehouse and did not
reenter until they had a search warrant. The warehouse was kept
under surveillance in the interim.1
The agents applied for a warrant without mentioning the
prior entry or any observations made during that entry. The war-
rant was issued at 10:40 p.m., and the agents immediately reen-
tered the warehouse and "seized 270 bales of marijuana and note-
I. Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
2. United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 591 (Ist Cir. 1985), modified, Mur-
ray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
3. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 591.
4. Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. at 2532 (1988). In this case, the Supreme
Court consolidated the appeals of Murray and Carter and granted certiorari. Both of these
appeals had been consolidated with United States v. Moscatiello at the appellate level.
5. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
6. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 595.
7. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
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books listing customers for whom the bales were destined."8
Before trial, Murray and the other defendants moved to sup-
press the evidence discovered in the warehouse, arguing that the
warrant was invalid because the agents did not inform the Magis-
trate about the prior illegal entry and thereby the warrant was
tainted.9 The district court denied the motion, and the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed.' 0 Subsequently, the defendants
filed petitions for certiorari, which were granted by the United
States Supreme Court." The Court ordered the judgments va-
cated and the case remanded to the district court. The Court held
that evidence first discovered through an illegal search may be ad-
mitted if the later search, pursuant to a warrant, was an indepen-
dent source of the evidence.12
This Note will begin with a brief discussion of the cases lead-
ing up to Murray. Next, it will examine the Murray decision itself
and the manner in which the majority and the dissenters applied
the previous case law and policies underlying the exclusionary
rule. Finally, this Note will analyze the majority and dissenting
opinions, concluding that the majority's decision may seriously
erode the fourth amendment rights protected by the exclusionary
rule.
I. HISTORY
The exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evidence ac-
quired during an illegal search.'" The exclusionary rule was first
applied in 1914 to protect fourth amendment rights in Weeks v.
United States.4 In 1961, the Supreme Court held that the exclu-
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2535.
13. Id. at 2532 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) and Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).
14. 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that in a criminal prosecution, federal courts can-
not retain for evidence against the defendant his illegally seized letters where the defendant
has applied for their return).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
[Vol. 39:641
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sionary rule applied to the states via the fourteenth amendment in
Mapp v. Ohio.'5
An early case applying the exclusionary rule also noted that
there could be an exception to that rule. In Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States,'" the Supreme Court stated:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall
not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.
Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained be-
come sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained
from an independent source they may be proved like any others
17
In Murray,18 the Supreme Court referred to this exception to the
exclusionary rule as the "'independent source' doctrine" in the
"specific sense."' 19 This doctrine applies to the illegally-obtained
evidence itself which is later found in a legal, independent way.
One should note, however, that the discussion of the "independent
source" in Silverthorne Lumber was dicta because there was no
independent source in that case.
The Murray Court also discussed the "'independent source'
doctrine" in the "general sense" as propounded in Segura v.
United States.20 In Segura, agents unlawfully entered the defend-
ant's apartment and stayed there until a search warrant was ob-
tained. The Supreme Court held that "evidence found for the first
time during the execution of the valid and untainted search war-
rant was admissible because it was discovered pursuant to an 'in-
dependent source.' "21 The independent source doctrine in the gen-
eral sense applies to separate evidence not found in the illegal
search. The doctrine in the "general sense" differs from the doc-
trine in the "specific sense," which applies to evidence found in
seized.
US. CONsT. amend. IV.
15. 367 U.S. 643 (1961)(holding that the fourth amendment guarantee of freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure protected a woman whose obscene materials were
seized without a search warrant and used to obtain a conviction against her for violating
state law).
16. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
17. Id. at 392.
18. Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
19. Id. at 2533.
20. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
21. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2533 (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813-
14 (1984)).
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the illegal search and later rediscovered by legal means. It is the
doctrine in its specific sense which is closer to the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine, first accepted by the Supreme Court in Nix v.
Williams.2
Williams involved the murder of a ten-year-old girl. In viola-
tion of the defendant's right to counsel, the police obtained from
the defendant incriminating statements about the location of the
victim's body.23 The Court held that the evidence was admissible
because the search parties would have found the body without the
benefit of the incriminating statements.24 The Court reasoned that
"[e]xclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably have been
discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a
criminal trial."2 5 Thus, the inevitable discovery doctrine and the
independent source doctrine set the stage for the issue in Murray.
II. Murray v. United States
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Murray, a four
to three decision. 6 He addressed the issue of "whether ...as-
suming evidence obtained pursuant to an independently obtained
search warrant, the portion of such evidence that had been ob-
served in plain view at the time of a prior illegal entry must be
suppressed. 1 7 The majority held that such evidence would not be
suppressed if "the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genu-
22. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
23. Id. at 435-36.
24. Id. at 449-50.
25. Id. at 446.
26. Justices Brennan and Kennedy did not participate in the consideration of the
cases consolidated in Murray. One may speculate that the 4-3 decision would have come
out differently had one or both of these justices participated. Justice Brennan, for instance,
dissented in both Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 458-60 (1984) and Segura v. United
States, 468 U.S. 796, 817-40 (1984) for various reasons.
In Nix v. Williams, Justice Brennan argued in dissent that the Court failed to see the
difference between the "inevitable discovery" exception and the "independent source" doc-
trine. Since the evidence was not actually obtained from an independent source, Brennan
would have required the government to show clear and convincing evidence that the cir-
cumstances actually amounted to an inevitable discovery which would have been found by
independent investigations.
In Segura, Justice Brennan joined the dissent of Justice Stevens arguing that the inde-
pendent source doctrine should not apply. The dissent was concerned that the majority was
providing an incentive for warrantless and unreasonable intrusions into the home. Thus, it
is likely that Justice Brennan would have had the same concerns in Murray.
27. Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2532 (1988).
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inely independent source of the information and tangible evidence
at issue here."'2 The legal search, the Court added, would not be
an independent source of the evidence "if the agents' decision to
seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the
initial entry, or if information obtained during that entry was
presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to issue the
warrant."29 The majority focused on the belief that the rationale
for the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct by
"putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they
would have been in if no police error or misconduct had oc-
curred."30 This focus by the majority formed the basis for the ma-
jority's difference of opinion with the dissenters.
Justice Scalia discussed the history of related exceptions to
the exclusionary rule:
This "inevitable discovery" doctrine [of Williams] obviously as-
sumes the validity of the independent source doctrine [in the
specific sense] as applied to evidence initially acquired unlaw-
fully. It would make no sense to admit the evidence because the
independent search, had it not been aborted, would have found
the [evidence], but to exclude the evidence if the search had
continued and had in fact found the [evidence]." l
Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded that the independent source
doctrine would apply in this case and allow the admission of the
marijuana as evidence.
Justice Scalia then addressed Murray's policy argument that
the majority's rule will encourage unlawful police searches. Mur-
ray claimed that if such evidence is not excluded, police will make
warrantless searches in order to determine whether they should
bother getting a warrant.32 Justice Scalia countered that such po-
lice action would be foolish. He reasoned that the act would "add
to the normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there is
probable cause the much more onerous burden of convincing a
trial court that no information gained from the illegal entry af-
fected either the law enforcement officer's decision to seek a war-
rant or the magistrate's decision to grant it."'33
28. Id. at 2535.
29. Id. at 2535-36 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 2533 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)).
31. Id. at 2534. Justice Marshall's dissent, however, distinguished the Williams situ-
ation. See infra text accompanying notes 36-37.
32. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2534.
33. Id.
1988-89]
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Finally, Justice Scalia reasoned that invoking the exclusion-
ary rule would put the police in a worse position than if no viola-
tion had occurred. The purpose of the exclusionary rule, according
to the majority, is to put the police in the same position as they
would have been in had the violation not occurred, not a worse
position.
Applying this new rule to the facts, the Court concluded that
the lower courts did not explicitly find that the agents would have
sought a warrant if they had not earlier entered the warehouse
illegally. Therefore, the Court remanded the cases for determina-
tion of whether the authorized search was an independent source
of the challenged evidence.
B. The Dissenters
In his dissenting opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Stevens, Justice Marshall emphasized the deterrence function of
the exclusionary rule. Arguing that the admission of the
"reseized" evidence encourages illegal searches, Justice Marshall
claimed that officers may perform illegal searches in order to de-
cide whether to take the time to get a warrant. He argued that
"[p]robable cause is much less than certainty, and many 'confir-
matory' searches will result in the discovery that no evidence is
present, thus saving the police the time and trouble of getting a
warrant."34
Justice Marshall explained that the majority's rule requiring
proof of "independence" does not provide enough protection
against police misconduct:
Under the circumstances of this case, the officers committing the
illegal search have both knowledge and control of the factors
central to the trial court's determination. First, it is a simple
matter, as was done in this case, to exclude from the warrant
application any information gained from the initial entry so that
the magistrate's determination of probable cause is not influ-
enced by the prior illegal search. Second, today's decision makes
the application of the independent source exception turn entirely
on an evaluation of the officer's intent . . . . The testimony of
the officers conducting the illegal search is the only direct evi-
dence of intent, and the defendant will be relegated simply to
arguing that the officers should not be believed. 5
34. Id. at 2538.
35. Id.
[Vol. 39:641
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In dealing with the history of the exclusionary rule, Justice
Marshall pointed out that Williams' inevitable discovery doctrine
required that, to find a search untainted by a prior illegal search,
the court must focus on "'demonstrated historical facts capable of
ready verification or impeachment.' ",36 He continued by pointing
out that "[ifn the instant case, there are no 'demonstrated histori-
cal facts' capable of supporting a finding that the subsequent war-
rant search was wholly unaffected by the prior illegal search ....
The only evidence available that the warrant search was wholly
independent is the testimony of the agents who conducted [the]
illegal search." 37
Justice Marshall also distinguished Segura from Murray by
noting that "[t]he admission of evidence first discovered during a
legal search does not significantly lessen the deterrence facing the
law enforcement officers contemplating an illegal entry so long as
the evidence that is seen is excluded." 38 The Segura Court distin-
guished evidence found during a prior warrantless entry from evi-
dence that was not found until a subsequent legal search."
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens criticized
Segura. He stated that Segura "'provide[s] government agents
with an affirmative incentive to engage in unconstitutional viola-
tions of the privacy of the home.' "40
III. ANALYSIS
The main difference between the majority and dissenting
opinions in Murray is one of focus. Justice Marshall's dissent fo-
cused on the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule, while
Justice Scalia's majority opinion focused on the exclusionary
rule's goal of putting the police in the same, not a worse, position
than if no violation had occurred.4 A second area of disagreement
36. Id. at 2539 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 n.5 (1984)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2540.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 817 (1984)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
41. The question of whether the exclusionary rule is the most effective means of
deterring unlawful police conduct is beyond the scope of this Note. As a basic foundation,
this Note assumes that exclusion of illegal evidence does deter illegal police conduct be-
cause the United States Supreme Court, by using the rule, accepts that premise. Other
commentators, however, have argued that the exclusionary rule does not adequately serve
the goal of deterrence. See generally S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE
PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 50-69, 56 (1977) ("there are several reasons
1988-891
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between the opinions is whether the Murray rule would deter un-
lawful police conduct.
The majority argued that its rule will deter law enforcement
officers from performing illegal searches. It reasoned that officers
will avoid "the . . . onerous burden of convincing a trial court
that no information gained from the illegal entry affected either
the law enforcement officers' decision to seek a warrant or the
magistrate's decision to grant it." 2
The Murray rule, however, does not create a strong deter-
rence for illegal police conduct. Even assuming that a courtroom
burden-of-proof rule would affect how officers in the field perform,
there are ways around the "onerous burden" the majority puts on
officers involved in illegal searches.
First, as Justice Marshall pointed out, the officers may ex-
clude any mention of an illegal search from a warrant request,
thereby insuring that the illegal search does not affect the magis-
trate's determination of probable cause. This prong of the major-
ity's analysis, therefore, is easy to satisfy.
The other prong of the majority's test, which examines
whether the illegal search affected the officers' decision to get a
warrant, also offers little deterrence to illegal police conduct. Jus-
tice Marshall argued that the only evidence available here would
be the officers' intent, and hence the officers' testimony at trial,
arguably an unreliable source of evidence where an individual's
fourth amendment rights are at stake.
Another problem with this prong of the majority's test is that
if a magistrate does not know of an illegal search and finds proba-
ble cause, such a finding will, in effect, create a presumption that
any illegal search did not affect the officers' decision to obtain a
warrant. A court will likely hold that when an officer has probable
cause before an illegal search is conducted, the officer probably
intended to get a warrant at that time anyway, and therefore the
illegal search did not affect his decision to obtain one.
Further, the majority in Murray seems misguided in asking
whether the illegal search "affected" the decision to seek a war-
rant. If the officer does not have probable cause before an illegal
search is conducted, he will not apply for a warrant. The officer,
however, may still perform, an illegal search to help decide
whether to continue gathering enough evidence to achieve proba-
for doubting the effectiveness of the [exclusionary] rule as a deterrent").
42. Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2534 (1988).
[Vol. 39:641
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ble cause. If probable cause is found, the officer then will obtain a
warrant. In that situation, the illegal search does not seem to "af-
fect" the decision to seek a warrant, it only affects the decision
whether to seek more legally obtained evidence.
One may argue that when officers do have probable cause, an
illegal search conducted to decide whether it is worth the time to
get a warrant does "affect[] ...the law enforcement officers' de-
cision to seek a warrant."4 3 Had the illegal search turned up noth-
ing, the officers would not have sought a warrant.
If, however, "affecting the officers' decision" is narrowly de-
fined as "changing the officers' minds," police will be able to per-
form risk-free illegal searches when they already have probable
cause but do not want to waste the time getting a warrant. In this
situation, an illegal search would "affect" the officers' decision
only when they find nothing and thereby decide not to get a war-
rant. However, even though the illegal search "affected" their de-
cision, there is no evidence to exclude because the police found
nothing. Moreover, when the police perform an illegal search
based on probable cause and do find something, the evidence rein-
forces rather than changes their decision to get a warrant. Thus,
evidence from the illegal search will not be excluded at trial.
The Court in Murray seems to agree with this narrow defini-
tion of "affect," stating that the evidence in Murray would not be
excluded if the lower court had "explicitly [found] that the agents
would have sought a warrant if they had not earlier entered the
warehouse."'44 This statement leads to the conclusion that officers,
with probable cause and plans to get a warrant, may perform an
illegal search to help them decide whether getting a warrant is
worth the time. It appears, therefore, that with or without proba-
ble cause, a decision to get a warrant rarely will be held to be
"affected" by an illegal search. Consequently, the majority's test
does not appear to further the deterrence function of the exclu-
sionary rule.
The Murray rule, however, does serve the majority's primary
goal of "putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than
they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had oc-
curred. '45 This goal was also enunciated in Williams as a way to
balance the interests "in deterring unlawful police conduct" and
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2536.
45. Id. at 2533 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)).
6491988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
"in having juries receive all probative evidence."4 6 It does not,
however, properly balance the concerns in the Murray situation,
where it has no effect in deterring fourth amendment violations.
In the Williams inevitable diicovery situation, different officers
are involved in the illegal search from those involved in the legal
search. Consequently, the officers conducting the illegal search are
not helped by such a search because anything they find will be
excluded, as far as they know. The evidence that is admitted is the
result of an independent legal investigation.
The emphasis of the Murrray majority on putting police in
the same position they would have been in had no violation oc-
curred shifts the focus away from what Williams II called the
"core rationale" for the exclusionary rule: deterrence of constitu-
tional and statutory violations.47 The majority's focus is too nar-
row and results in little or no deterrence to fourth amendment
violations by the police.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Murray gave too much weight to the concern of
admitting probative evidence into criminal trials. That concern is
very important, but it has been held that the goal of deterring
fourth amendment violations can outweigh that concern.4" The
majority in Murray, however, has honed a rule which provides
little deterrence to unlawful police conduct, forgetting that the
"purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.' -4o The Court in
Murray failed to remove the incentives for disregarding the pro-
tections of the fourth amendment. Instead, a court should exclude
the evidence in the Murray situation, giving "to the individual no
more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the po-
46. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).
47. Id. at 442-43.
48. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1914).
49. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
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lice officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is
entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in
the true administration of justice."5
JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER
50. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
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